Explosive Revelation: Imran Khan's Secret Oil Deal with Putin Exposed After His Ouster, Silencing Critics in Pakistan

Ali Chishti: Welcome to the Very Special Podcast today. I have my friend Dr. Peter Tapashkanov from Russia. He is visiting Karachi, and it's so good to meet you. It's my pleasure. Peter, how do you find Karachi?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: Unfortunately, it's a very brief visit, but it's a huge city, one of the biggest in the world with all these problems, and it's just impossible to explore in a few days. I'm here, yeah.

Ali Chishti: I'm sure. So, Peter, for our audience, you are a Ph.D. and an expert on India-Pakistan history. You are an expert on nuclear armaments, nuclear warheads, all about nuclear things and the geopolitics of this area. Your thesis was on state policies toward religious minorities in India and Pakistan and explored the pre-independence period as well because a lot of roots come from that period of time. There's a perception in India and Pakistan that Pakistan was created as a buffer state by the British to counter Russia. As a Russian, what do you think about it?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: Well, in the Soviet times, it was a mixture of feelings about Pakistan and India as well. Regarding Pakistan, there is a legend not supported by evidence. Stalin was very surprised how Pakistan could survive having these two big parts in Eastern Pakistan and Western Pakistan. However, I don't remember any reports about considering Pakistan as a buffer state built by the UK. Very soon, the Soviet Union realized that India wasn't a colony anymore. It became very independent and quickly became a good friend of the Soviet Union. So there was no reason. But Pakistan developed very close relations with the United States, including the use of an air base near Peshawar in Badaber to send surveillance aircraft to observe testing sites in Kazakhstan and deep inside Soviet territory. Also, the United States rented a seismological station built by the UK to observe nuclear testing in the Soviet Union. Because of these and many other examples, even in the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviet Union realized that it wasn't about the United Kingdom. It was about a rapidly developing Cold War, and Pakistan was a part of military blocs and provided facilities for the United States to follow developments inside the Soviet Union.

Ali Chishti: And you were doing it from Bangladesh, which was East Pakistan then, for surveillance on China as well, right? Coming back to this, there's been a myth in Pakistan that the Russian delegation or Moscow wanted to invite Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to Moscow and he didn't go there, instead opting to go to the United States. That angered Russia.

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: Yes, it's true. But it happened with India as well. As you remember, the first visit of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was to the United States when he met President Eisenhower, rather than visiting the Soviet Union. But then, the Soviet Union developed very good relations with Marshal Ayub Khan. The Soviet Union played a role in the Tashkent agreement, helping to end the first big war in the region. Of course, this agreement didn't last for a long period of time. The Indian Prime Minister died, and I even watched a Bollywood movie based on the story related to Prime Minister Shastri when he passed away in Tashkent. But then Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union, and he had very good agreements with the Soviet Union. The idea was to develop relations. At that time, the connecting routes between the Soviet Union and Pakistan were better than now because we used to have a direct flight. That flight was from Moscow to Jakarta, but because aircraft couldn't fly long distances back then, the first stop was in Karachi. Now we don't have a direct flight from Moscow to Pakistan.

Ali Chishti: Let's take this in steps. In the '70s, the Cold War escalated and was fought in Afghanistan. There’s a common myth in Pakistan that the Russians wanted access to the blue waters in Balochistan and supported some separatist movements in Balochistan through Afghan proxies. How true is that?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: But Ali, we skipped a very important period after the end of the 1971 war when your leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, decided to overcome the role the Soviet Union played in the disintegration of Pakistan into two parts. The Soviet Union supported India and the movement in Eastern Pakistan and supported Bangladesh from the beginning. Bhutto decided to develop relations with the Soviet Union and agreed on many things with them. It was important because it helped the Soviet Union realize that this war changed Pakistan’s strategic perceptions. Before this war, Pakistan and the United States had an agreement about military aid in the case of conflict, and the United States didn’t help Pakistan during that difficult time. That is why after the war, Pakistan sped up relations with China and tried to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. It was successful until the political changes in Pakistan.

Ali Chishti: We had the Karachi Steel Mill set up by the Russians during Bhutto's time.

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: Absolutely. Often in our exchanges between Russia and Pakistan, we refer to the Karachi Steel Mill. Bringing a huge production facility means a lot of engineers and Soviet people came here. It was a very ambitious project for our relations, and many people still remember it. Unfortunately, Russia couldn't continue to develop this together with Pakistan.

Ali Chishti: So, it became part of the Cold War, with Pakistan playing an active role. Now, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was a belief in Pakistan that the Soviets wanted access to the blue waters in Balochistan. How did the USSR view Pakistan at that time?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: There are obvious points about Pakistan supporting Mujahideen, but Pakistan wasn't alone. China and Iraq were also involved, supplying weapons to the Mujahideen. From this perspective, Pakistan played its role. But regarding Soviet plans concerning Pakistan, there were ideas to be more proactive and enter Pakistan's territory. Ambassador Zamir Kabulov, our top diplomat in charge of Russian policy in South Asia, mentioned that at that time, the Soviet Union considered the possibility that Pakistan could have a nuclear weapon. This consideration deterred the Soviet Union from having any adventures concerning Pakistan. Even if Pakistan didn't have a nuclear weapon, the Soviets considered it a deterrent capability.

Ali Chishti: As a nuclear expert, when do you think Pakistan's nuclear capabilities were developed? Was it in the early '80s or late '80s?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: It's covered by Pakistani scholars in memoirs and reflections, including the famous book "Eating Grass" by Feroz Khan. But what's interesting is that it's not necessary to have a nuclear bomb to have a nuclear deterrent. This was visible during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The Soviet assessment was that Pakistan, in case of an invasion, would use all its capabilities, conventional mostly, against the Soviet Union. This consideration played a significant role in Soviet strategic planning.

Ali Chishti: Could Pakistan have used a nuclear weapon in a buffer state like Afghanistan?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: It's possible. But another aspect is that the Soviet Union's collapse was due to many factors, not just the Afghanistan war. Domestic issues, economic strains, and national politics played a significant role. The Soviet Union spent a tremendous amount of money on developing military capabilities during the Cold War, leading to economic exhaustion. The opening of the information space by Mikhail Gorbachev also played a part, as it allowed public discussion and national aspirations to come to the forefront. The elite's decision to collapse the Soviet Union instead of preserving it was a critical factor.

Ali Chishti: After the USSR started breaking down, what were the main reasons? Was it the Afghanistan war or the Cold War?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: The collapse was mainly due to domestic issues and the economy. The Soviet Union spent a fantastic amount of money on military capabilities to win the Cold War. By the mid-1980s, we were at a high point of the Cold War, ready to fight the United States and NATO. But the collapse was also due to the national politics and aspirations of various nations within the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev opened the information space, it led to a blast of different voices and publications, helping these nations realize they could be independent. The economic strain and weaknesses in national policies, along with the elite's decision to let go, led to the collapse. It was a quick and mostly peaceful process.

Ali Chishti: Boris Yeltsin played a significant role in this transition. What was his impact on Russia?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: Boris Yeltsin was a human leader who showed his emotions and weaknesses. He built his legacy on interactions with people and visiting new countries. He could make strong decisions, like indicating his negative reaction to the crisis in Yugoslavia in 1999. However, the situation in Chechnya was different. Inviting people to be independent and then stopping them led to conflicts. Yeltsin realized that allowing more republics to become independent would lead to unstoppable violence. Despite his flaws, Yeltsin groomed Vladimir Putin, who brought stability and predictability, which the people appreciated.

Ali Chishti: Putin's rise brought a new confidence to Russia. How did this transformation happen?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: Putin's early years were marked by a realization that relations with the West wouldn't be as brilliant as expected. Despite early efforts, like discussing NATO membership, Russia started to see itself as distinct from the West. The new Russia under Putin focused on stability, economic development, and a strong international presence. The economy, while not central to the world, is resilient. Despite sanctions and restrictions, Russia adapted and found solutions. The conflict in Ukraine was a shock but also led to a rethinking of Russia's positioning in the world, emphasizing Eurasian cooperation.

Ali Chishti: Prime Minister Imran Khan's visit to Moscow coincided with President Putin announcing the Ukraine invasion. Was this a deliberate move?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: It's difficult to assess fully, but Imran Khan likely had some intel about the impending invasion, given the public statements by the United States. However, many were skeptical about a full-scale military campaign. Despite this, Khan’s visit went ahead, and he mentioned negotiations for cheaper oil, which happened later after his government fell. Russia supplied oil to Pakistan at a cheaper rate, but it wasn't a long-term agreement.

Ali Chishti: You wrote about Pakistan's help to Ukraine in military assistance. How is this seen, given the growing ties between Pakistan and Russia?

Dr. Peter Tapashkanov: The story was first reported by Indian media and seemed credible. Russia officially demonstrated its position on this matter. Pakistan, facing economic challenges and needing to restore its economy post-COVID and floods, found itself in a complex situation. Despite closer military and cultural ties with Russia, reports of Pakistan providing artillery shells to Ukraine indicate the multifaceted nature of international relations.

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